Decline And Fall Of Empires In The World History Essay

pooh-pooh And Fall Of pudding stones In The humankind Hi stage EssayPublished on the Cappuccino Culture page of the witnesser web site on 23rd November 2009 under the heading Decline and Fall is an animated cartoon representing the recounting sizes of conglomerates from 1800 until the present day.iEach pudding stone is represented by a blob that either increases or decreases in size over the period. The collapse of the red blob representing the British Empire, the biggest, is of incline marked in the period from the finish of the First foundation War. The just comment this web page elicits is single which nones, this was non interesting you steal three and a half minutes of my life. I offer this getting even factual observation at the start of an essay which forget restrict forth to show that the British overt do indeed pull in an interest of sorts in the fib of their imperium, only one that perhaps is non entirely at one with the grabs of historians. As a listeners comment on the BBC Radio 4 explanation of the empire puts it,iihalf the world whitethorn hate the English for the success that was the empire, the former(a) half for the scourge inflicted upon them, exclusively please stop it with the apologies. Put simply my pipeline is that while bet on colonial theories of empire may cool it be in the cutting edge for academics, the British humanitys thought has developed a more(prenominal) Whigish tendency natural of nostalgia. Niall Fergusson has come to be portrayed as the primary advocate of the ideal of the benefits of empire.Niall Fergussons book, Empire how Britain make the modern world,iiiwas accompanied by a idiot box series on street 4. The success of the programme was to cook up its presenter alongside the equals of Simon Schama and Kenneth Clarke, as a substantially k nown nature with his own cult of popularity. For Fergusson it raised a profile which is now naturalised in neo-conservative circles in the US, and he has become a prolific perceiver on current affairs for a numerate of media step uplets. He is wide recognised as clever and provocative, and has move to develop his controversial argument that the British empire was non bad(predicate) for the world.ivWhile Fergussons forte is undoubtedly economic science and finance, an ara of scholarship where much of his other normalations atomic number 18 situated, he does non skimp on ranging crossways the panoply of empire history including heapting out where the British empire went wrong the horrors of slavery or the brutality that occurred at the Battle of Omdurman. In asking whether the empire was on balance good or bad, his view domiciliate be summed in his own lyric poem that, no organisation has done more to promote the free work of goods, capital and labour than the British empire in the 19th and twentieth centuries. And no organisation has done more to impose western norms of law, point and governance around the world.vA Gallup poll taken in 1998 imbed a British the vulgar who were unapologetic about the Empire. As the economic expert noted, the politically correct idea that in that respect was something shameful about colonising rangy swaths of the world had poor resonance amongst the public.viThis was the same year that Tony Blair was busily articulating Britain as, peaceful Britannia, a model 21st century nation to the Labour fellowship conference. Whilst 60% of those polled regretted the empires passing, only 13% purview that the country could cede kept up(p) its imperial possessions if it had wished. still the way Tony Blair talked about empire had agitated to reflect this public mood. It had developed from what had been the normal reference in the leaders conference linguistic communication to decolonisation. By the 1997 conference the creation of a signifi discountt empire was one of a long list of British achievements. A minor change but perhaps significant presump tuousness the New Labour readiness at the judgment of conviction to smack and articulate the centre of attention ground of the electorate.It is a tautological statement to say that nations develop differing narratives of their imperial bequest. such narratives impart help shape contemporary popular views. In particular, it will deform the judgement as to whether the firing of an empire was viewed as a defeat, and if so, whether there was a consequential impact on perceptions of national self esteem. Kumars compare of the French and English ascertain is instructive.viiHe notes that for the English the distinction among past and present is pointless the future is viewed through the resource of a thoroughly assimilated history. This is secerned with the turbulence of late French history where the past carcass alive. The result for Kumar is that the French now exact a significant impost of self reflection which manifests itself in a strong experience of nationalism and national identity element. He contrasts this strongly with the English case. And in considering this more proper(postnominal)ally within the scope of empire, the overall French perception was driven by their not be as successful as their imperial competitors, in either the scale of the empire they achieved, or the subsequent management of decolonisation.The end of the British Empire was not only rapid but alike remarkably peaceful, notwithstanding some outbreaks of nationalist hostility. It was not accompanied by radical political upheaval in Britain itself, all was calm. The British had presum commensurate accepted the collapse of their empire with an equanimity bordering on indifference,viiiwhich was a contrast with France and Portugal, where decolonisation was followed by political convulsion at home. As David Cannadine cogently puts it in a book of essays on Britains adjustment to the evil of empire, the British Empire may perplex been win in a fit of absence seizure o f mind, but as far as the majority of the population seems to have been concerned, it was given away in a fit of collective indifference.ixThis is not a nation grieving a collective thought of loss.But much(prenominal) analysis maybe a subaltern too simple. on that point could have been in the popular British psyche a see trade off surrounded by the perceived benefits of keeping the empire as opposed to the alternatives. The eclipse of empire could have passed unnoticed against a back endground knowledge to a shattering of the faith of imperial markets which occurred before decolonisation took place, and so after 1945 the social priorities that were accorded to the welfare state and industrial intervention to economise material improvement.xIt is clear this argument can be developed further to include other events in post war Britain such as the European Union dimension, and the unwillingness or ability to afford high levels of defence expenditure and its consequential impact. The reorientation from the east to Europe was wellspring on the way by 1998 as the Gallup survey noted. 50% thought Europe preferably than the empire meant more to Britain.xiA further torsion to the popular view of empire can be developed, which is a tapestry of opinion that reflects the internal boundaries of the United Kingdom. The title of Condor and Abells work says it all in this regard, Romantic Scotland, tragic England, ambiguous Britain.xiiThe conclusions from the interviews that formed the basis of the research showed that in Scotland, respondents inferred heroic national character from Scotlands role in the Empire. Whereas in England, the story of empire was understood to represent a product of excessive nationalism. However, the concept of Britishness was in both groups understood to predate and postdate the history of empire. This is in fact just other way of saying that as a nation the British had assimilated the empire rise and fall to their own histor ic narrative.A consequence of the decolonising experience in Britain appears to have been that the recent training of history is devoid of content when it comes to the empire. Indeed if I recall both my O and A level history creases in the late 1970s, empire did not prominently figure. Such a notion was explored by a Prince of Wales summer school in 2003. The rub of the question was that if European imperialism was the more or less important historic trend of the 19th century, and the British Empire was the biggest and or so important of the empires, why did it not it figure more prominently in schools watching? As the Guardian reported, schools do workweek after week of British social history and only one week on the empire. In terms of entailment it is not enough.xiiiThe knowledge of empire amongst a generation now one step removed from the Second humanness War and the decolonisation afterward is too superficial. Our aggravation Fergusson summed the point,xivwe can memori se the British Empire without saying its either a good or a bad thing. It is both good and bad. One simply necessityfully to know about it how it arose and how it go downs. These questions arent in anyway politically loaded. Theres an incredible uproar from the 60s left that says anything about empire must be bad. Im in no way pushing my own interpretation of empire. Its just that it should be at the core of what we teach people about modern history.The reluctance of schools to teach the history of empire and even more the examination boards to set the programme is bamboozling and introductory smacks of avoidance. But avoidance as a consequence of what disturbance at the event or the analysis? An Ofsted report on the teaching method of history in schools questioned whether a lesson on empire in a three year history course was sufficient given the subjects significance and concluded it was not.xvIt found that pupils aged 16 would have had 3 or 4 lessons on the subject of e mpire in their previous 5 old age at school. But this is not about providing a one(a) explanation of empire in the classroom. The advice Ofsted gave to schools was that pupils should know about the empire and that it has been taken by historians and others in different ways.However, others in education were more fricative in their chidings. Dr Andrew Cunningham, a teacher, fence ind that while the empire might be forgotten in the UK, around the world this was far less likely to be the case where the imperial bequest was the English language, a strong sense of liberty, an impartial legal system and stable parliamentary government.xviHe excessively noted that the legacy lived on within the UK with an ethnically diverse populace drawn from across the former colonies and living together in relative harmony.In an increasely globalised and interconnected world the existence of old tie in between peoples, such as language and law, are fundamental mental synthesis blocks for future relationships. They together with immigration to Britain are important legacies from empire. The Commonwealth bruised and buffet in the 1960s and 1970s retains a surprising utility as a dense global network of internal connections, valued by its numerous small states.xviiWhether or not this judgement shows a handing over in the historical analysis of the empire by the BBC is only a question that the corporation itself might answer. But the analysis has moved on from that of an earlier BBC website for school children which starkly noted,xviiithe Empire came into enceinteness by cleanup position lots of people .. and stealing their countries.The issue of hindsight is key in considering historical perspective, and that is as true for analysis of the British Empire as for other events in the past. Time and distance aid the historian by respond the question of what happened next. It is only in the recent 10 to 20 years that histories of the British Empire can begin to be written by those for whom the ideology of decolonisation is a historical phenomenon. Now they are able to judge the claims and successes of what the Ghandis and company of the world constructed as well as assailed.xixIn chronological terms, Fergusson fits neatly into the category of young historians that Richenberg had identified and to whom he offered such a proposition. As he says, umteen of the sins of dictatorship, tribalism and exploitation which the British pull in Africa have been overshadowed by those of their colonial successors. It is not that this legitimises the wrongs of the Empire, but it makes it easier for many to attempt to interpret what was a liberal empire as an intellectually flawed but not dishonourable attempt to solve problems. With little adjustment such observations would suffice for a publishing editors summary for the back cover of Fergussons book.While retrospection is an aid to comparative analysis it is excessively an equally useful tool for those who believe the legacies of empire might not always be viewed quite so benignly through such an optic. Jack stem, when Foreign Secretary, identified Britains imperial past as the spring of many of the modern worlds political problems, including the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Kashmir dispute.xxFergusson, perhaps predictably commented that Mr Straw was guilty of chanting the old National Union of Students refrain we are to blame.xxiConversely though, there is a view for casing that the partition in India/Pakistan was now far more important as the defining context for contemporary and future politics, than the legacy of the empire. Perhaps while retrospection helps it does need to be treated with a degree of caution. It is always easy to be wise after the event or as Barry Buzan from the LSE noted in the same condition, like looking back at a impale of chess its much easier afterwards to work out what the moves should have been. In doing so he captured the views of other historians such a s Andrew Roberts and J B Kelly.This gradual development of the view of Empire from apologist during decolonisation to now more benignly contemplative is most clearly reflected in the Commonwealth. present former colonies are private nations bonding of their own volition as equals. It shows too that the assimilation of history into a continuous narrative is not solely a British experience. As an institution during the 60s and 70s the Commonwealth was viewed by most as an irrelevance. Indeed during the 1980s, Britain was isolated over its stance on South Africa. Now it is a family of 54 member countries with membership across all the worlds continents, including 1.8 billion people, or 30% of the worlds population. Extraordinarily 50% of that unite population are under 25 and so, many are in some cases 2 or 3 generations removed from direct experience of colonial rule.xxiiThe Royal Commonwealth Societys website describes how all its members are united by agreed common values, princip les, heritage and language. They also share similar systems of law, public administration and education and work together in a meat of cooperation, partnership and understanding. The increasing positioning of the organisation is such that membership continues to draw to countries that were outside British colonial rule, for instance Rwanda. There is a covert of human experience and values implicit in what the Society says it is not unrealistic or even nostalgic about the past but in effect says, we are where we are, lets look forward. Given the ethnic mutation of the British population, the Commonwealth is a link by which various disaporia can remain in touch around the world.The Commonwealth is for most of the British public the most visible living legacy of the empire, with its link championed by a monarch who has lived through the decolonisation process. A living body, not a colonial relic, the Commonwealth is a successful story which looks set to streng and so in the future . It has 5 of the worlds economically fastest growing countries (including India) as members and the connections arising from the legacy of British rule mean trading costs 15% less than elsewhere in the world.xxiiiThe Commonwealth has developed into a consensual, informal and adaptable organisation that could be uniquely useful. Such a view cannot help strengthen the bodys reputation in the British publics perception. As the effect of Britons with recollections of colonialism are relatively few, such a modern image could well colour perceptions of empire and make its legacy appear benign.The passage of m might have started to heal some of the rawness that underpinned the harsher views of empire that were prevalent in the latter half of the twentieth century during the decolonisation process. The link between many of the liberation movements in the old colonies and Marxism was strong. The subsequent defeat of collectivism in west and the strengthening of liberal explanations of th e benefits of market capitalism and nation has also helped to soften the often black and white terms in which empires were viewed during decolonisation. But it is the case too that the political left might be leaving its traditionally hostile view of the colonial legacy behind. Clare curt as the Minister for International Development wrote to her Zimbabwean opposite number in 1998, (we are as a government) without links to our colonial interests.xxivAn example of overall softening of the retrospective views of empire was set out by Michael Palin in an interview when he became the new President of the Royal geographical Society.xxvBelieving that it might now be the time for Britain to stop fixating on the negative aspects of empire, he said, if we say that all of our past involvement with the world was bad and wicked and wrong, I think we are doing ourselves a great disservice. It has set up lines of communication between people that are still very strong. We still have links with other countries culturally, politically and socially that perhaps we shouldnt forget. Commenting on the interview the historian, Andrew Roberts,xxvisaid, alleluia Mr Palin is quite right to acknowledge that the British Empire has been taught in particularly abject way in recent years.But before we all get somewhat carried away, some sense of proportion is important. Historians do consider themselves the purveyors of what might be the inconvenience of truth. though even they are sometimes forced to criticise the over eagerness of their profession. My point is ably demonstrated by David Anderson in a polish of the work of the American historian Caroline Elkins.xxviiShe had assessed the number of Africans killed by the British in the Mau Mau rebellion as 300,000. The figure had provoked considerable criticism including from Anderson who had personally researched the field. Noting the affect of such exaggeration was to give succour to defenders of the legacy of empire, he was riot ous to make the counter point. While the British were no more atrocious as imperialists that anyone else, they were no better. It is time we set deflection British amnesia and squared up to the realities of our empire, he wrote.In British politics there has been for most of the 20th century amongst the left a perceived connection between colonialism and capitalism. The expectation was the demise of empire would avail the building of a socialist club. But even where over time the economic arguments against colonialism splintered or faded the principles of the right to national determination and a generalised internationalism survived.xxviiiMovements such as that for Colonial Freedom, launched in 1954, had at heart a deeply held view that colonialism was an evil for British society as well as for the colonised because it was morally corrupting to the identity of the British self.If it is the development of broader political thinking in society that helps set the context for the acc eptability or otherwise of fresh historical analysis, then there has been some perceptible recent shifts. A speech by Gordon cook on Britishness in 2004 it drew both on booster cable historians of the British national story and cast a net into more right wing territory too. The reasoning was that it was politically disastrous for centre left parties to abandon the ground of national identity and patriotism.xxixAs Brown reflected on the historical aspects of being British, there was a Whigish air to his account. whatsoever sense that the political aspect of decolonisation is the pervading approach amongst historians has long started to ebb. Whilst the sign veer away from an Anglo-centric perspective on the break-up of empire still keep some elements of a political theme, the focus has moved to the study of individual countries achievement of self-determination.xxxThere is still a considerable way to go in the historiography of empire, for instance in terms of the study of womens history.Coincident with the increasing profile of Fergusson in the mid-noughties, a number of historians have delivered grounding open frame research into the legacy of empire along these new lines. Andersons research on the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya in the 1950s was one such case. Undermining the have wisdom of an orderly retreat and deals done at conferences is that empires are not glorious being concerned with the power relations, the domination, often de-humanisation, of one rush along by another. For Anderson the British empire was no different.xxxiHis research has been more focused, not the coffee table book tableau view, but dealing with specific events or countries shining a light upward into how we might view the empire enterprise as a whole. The irony here though is not that Fergussons work is viewed as novel or controversial rather it is the thesis that must be challenged, rather than challenge.However, Stephen Howes claim that Andersons work will transform our underst anding of how the British Empire ended and force a wide re-evaluation of Britains modern history is pushing the point.xxxiiThe issue remains that a considerable body of the new work that is aimed at the wider readership is still Anglo-centric. The stimulate here is that Fergusson is not a heavyweight historian, with his works relying too hard on secondary texts. As the reassessment of empire progresses with old mythologies being re-evaluated as opposed to rehashed there is a danger that work like Andersons are not permeating effectively enough into the popular historiesxxxiii. Tapan Raychaudhuri in considering the legacy of empire from the Indian perspective argues that few serious historians in India see much that was good in Britains imperial record. However, there is little evidence to suggest that in terms of empires legacy with the British public that such a view has entered the general consciousness.The impact on Britain of the loss of an empire is different from that on the former colonial states who composed it. It can be hypothesised that the recent British experience was one of be access a new nation born from a loss of identity (empire) rather than through the more normal moment of achievement of self-determination and sovereignty. The British and maybe its currently subordinate identities have only begun to value their status as a nation as they have lost its as an empire. Looking to the future, rather than embraced tradition, the past is a foreign country.xxxivHowever, this thesis rather misses the point. The relationship to football that Robinson uses is not strong enough. Past results, whether triumphant or ignominious, are sustained in the pantheon of the football clubs history together with the folklore that accompanies them. It is no guide to future performance on the pitch but it is not dumped, as history becomes part of the living entity that is the club. Extrapolating to Britain, the same is true history has not been forgotten but assi milated.The notion of popular imperialism is not a new one. Indeed the Falklands war in 1982 could be argued to be the brave visible outpouring of such sentiment, though the peaceful return of Hong Kong is another somewhat less jingoist example. It should not be a confusion that a positive idea of the empires legacy or receptiveness (even amongst the cynicism of the Channel 4 commissioning editors) to the work of authors such as Fergusson does exist. The success of imperialism as a popular cultural phenomena during the 20th century was set out by MacKenzie.xxxvThe empires popularity was a core ideology in Britain which later morphed into nostalgia.However, given natural human emotions, it would be hardly surprising that the visible and quick end of empire after 1945 would not evoke such sentiment. equally the extent though that nostalgia was a means of escaping the harsh realities of the day is of course a moot point. Though as the Economist noted,xxxvihaving taken the loss of em pire relatively lightly, the British publics concept of identity had been fortified by a comforting set of images of national heroism derived from the Second World War. But nostalgia can be both melancholic as well as euphoric. In the late 1970s the economic and political challenges in Britain were different from today and discussion was focused on how their malaise join with the loss of an empire could be met.xxxviiEvents like Suez summed up the sense of decline associated with decolonisation, but in the public consciousness, victory in the South Atlantic in 1982 has to some extent become linked with economic enlighten and major social readjustment.Today notions of nostalgia continue to be reinforced by newspaper articles,xxxviiifor instance those covering the current troubles in Yemen. In an article headed, We regret driving out the British, ex-Marxist revolutionaries spoke nostalgically of imperial master they had fought to remove. Whilst patently British rule is not going to r eturn to Yemen, the continued theme of such articles together with similar ones that most of us have read with regard to the Indian sub-continent reinforce a narrative that underpins the sum of the some of the putative benefits of imperial rule albeit driven more by nostalgia than rigorous analysis.Whilst the revival of the neo-Whig view of empire is associated with Fergusson it is possible to see the earlier emergence of the same train of thought. Max Beloff noted that for younger historians coming of age when he was writing in 1995, an optimistic view of empire was not difficult to find, where the sins of empire had been redeemed by a legacy of democratic institutions and liberal ideas, notably represented by the Commonwealth.xxxixHe continued, the history of the British Empire could be studied to see how this glorious performance had been achieved. I would not be so bold as to argue that this was an executive instruction to Fergusson, but my point is that the structure of the a rgument was already there, albeit in an embryonic way. However, when Clements at a similar time made his plea for more analysis of the economics of empire as a means to aiding its public reassessment, he probably did not have the cathexis that Fergusson subsequently took in mind.xlIts conclusions were probably 180 degrees out from what he had anticipated.We have all engaged around the dining room table or at the pub in those rather spurious conversations along the lines of what if we hadnt won the first world war. Such counter factual analyses of history are popular but their value debateable. But it is unsurprising in the sense of the determination to provoke that Fergusson edited a book of counterfactual essays. Such work as Fergusson himself points out challenges conventional approaches to the study of history. E H Carr dismissed counterfactual history as a mere living room game and red herring, while E